ALPR Safeguards: What the Manhattan Institute Report Means for Police

The Manhattan Institute’s September 2026 report, Automatic License Plate Readers: Benefits, Risks, and Sensible Regulation, responds to the recent backlash against ALPRs, including polling declines, vandalized cameras, and proposed bans. The authors argue that the technology is not new, since police have used it for decades, and that the best available evidence supports its value. The researchers cite a paper covering 216 departments that found an 11 percent drop in motor vehicle theft and a 16 percent rise in theft clearance rates after ALPR deployment, along with camera studies from other countries that show crime reductions. The report also notes that appellate courts have unanimously rejected Fourth Amendment challenges to ALPR use, arguing that cameras cover too little roadway to function as mass surveillance.

The Manhattan Institute report acknowledges that misuse is a legitimate concern and recommends regulation in place of bans. To ensure the full investigative benefits of ALPR, while maintaining safeguards, the report proposes seven agency guidelines, including access logging, supervisory approval for certain queries, a 30-day data retention limit, regular audits, criminal penalties for misuse, restriction of use to serious crimes, and a ban on cameras near places of worship, polling places, and medical facilities.

Vehicles sit at the center of American crime. The National Insurance Crime Bureau (NICB) counted 850,708 vehicles that were stolen nationwide in 2024, which works out to roughly 97 vehicles stolen every hour in the US. Each theft costs the owner transportation, time, and money, and each one adds to the caseload of investigators who are already stretched thin.

The harm does not stop with the original theft. NICB stated in a letter to the Vermont legislature that stolen vehicles are often used in secondary crimes, including robbery, murder, arson, and drug and human trafficking. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) found that 97 percent of car thieves face other serious charges and described stolen vehicles as the starting point for much high-impact crime.

The Manhattan Institute report notes that agencies nationwide cleared only 10.5 percent of motor vehicle thefts in 2025. Automatic license plate readers (ALPRs) help close that gap by enabling agencies to find investigative leads in stolen-vehicle cases and other crimes involving a vehicle.

The Manhattan Institute report’s authors state plainly that the research base is still developing, and they describe the early evidence as pointing in one direction. The strongest ALPR-specific study to date is a working paper from the University of South Carolina. The report notes that the University of South Carolina study examines ALPR deployments across 216 police departments using FBI National Incident-Based Reporting System data and compares agencies that adopted the cameras with those that had not yet done so. The university researchers found an 11 percent reduction in motor vehicle theft and a 16 percent increase in motor vehicle theft clearance rates.

Because only one quasi-experimental ALPR study exists, the report also reviews research on cameras in general. Four studies the Manhattan Institute report pointed out about camera rollouts all found crime reductions: about 25 percent in the Stockholm subway, 20 percent in treated areas of Montevideo, 19 percent overall in Medellín, and roughly 10 percent for each doubling of cameras in a Chinese study. Cameras and ALPRs are not identical tools, so the authors treat these results as supporting evidence rather than proof.

Privacy objections have driven much of the opposition, so the Manhattan Institute report examines Fourth Amendment doctrine at length. Courts ask whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in what the government observed, and that expectation is lower for vehicles on public roads. Per the Institute’s report, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Knotts (1983) that a person traveling on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in those movements.

Appellate courts have applied that framework to ALPRs and have been unanimous in rejecting constitutional challenges. Several of these courts distinguished ALPR data from the location records per the Institute’s report, noting that ALPR cameras capture images of vehicles at specific points and do not chronicle a person’s movements over time.

The Supreme Court’s 2026 decision in Chatrie v. United States extended a previous decision in Carpenter v. United States to historical location data, and some critics expect it to affect ALPR litigation. The Manhattan Institute report notes that the data in Carpenter recorded locations about 101 times a day, and the data in Chatrie every two minutes, a granularity ALPR networks do not approach.

The Manhattan Institute report authors acknowledge that misuse of ALPR systems is a legitimate concern, and they recommend regulation in place of bans. Their proposals are meant for both department policy and state law, and the report includes model legislation.

These are the Manhattan Institute’s seven recommendations:

1.      Logging. Agencies should record every database access under a unique user ID with a specific case reason entered at the time of the query. A detailed record shows auditors who searched for what and why. It also deters personal use, because every query is attributable.

2.      Supervisory approval. Historical queries by non-investigators, other than for crimes in progress, and queries by personnel who are off duty should require documented supervisor approval. This adds a second reviewer where the risk of improper use is highest. Store supervisory approvals in auditable logs.

3.      Retention limits. Data should be kept no longer than 30 days unless it is tied to an active investigation or prosecution and approved by a supervisor. A short default period limits how much information exists to be misused. Investigators keep access to the data that matters to open cases.

4.      Audits. Agencies should use provider-supplied misuse flags and conduct their own quarterly review of system use. The audits should cover both efficacy and evidence of abuse. Agencies should make a summary of the results public each year, giving the community a basis for evaluating the program.

5.      Criminal penalties and exclusion. Using an ALPR system for personal gain or to harm another person should carry criminal penalties and bar the offender from future police employment. Data obtained in violation of these rules should be inadmissible in court. The report notes that many documented cases came to light through auditing, which indicates that oversight tools work.

6.      Major crime focus. Investigative queries should be limited to violent felonies, theft, burglary, arson, gun offenses, drug offenses, hit-and-runs, and kidnappings or abductions, with an exception for emergencies and hot list requests. Police-operated ALPRs should never be used to issue fines for parking, non-felony speeding, or similar minor violations. Keeping the technology tied to serious offenses protects its public legitimacy.

7.      Sensitive places. Cameras should not be placed within 100 feet of a place of worship, polling place, or medical facility without the owner’s permission. Systems should also not retain images that show a significant portion of the interior of a private residence or other establishment. These limits address privacy concerns where they are strongest.

The Manhattan Institute report makes a clear case that vehicle crime is a serious, high-volume problem and that ALPRs give agencies a practical way to address it. The research it reviews points to lower motor vehicle theft and higher clearance rates, and appellate courts have consistently upheld ALPR use under the Fourth Amendment. The authors also treat misuse as a real risk, which is why they pair the technology with seven safeguards.

PlateRanger™ powered by Rekor® meets the logging, audit, and retention safeguards through its design. The platform logs user activity, including logins, plate and vehicle searches, and hotlist changes, and agencies can require a search justification for each plate search. Administrators can use those records to review user actions, which gives agencies the audit trail they need for quarterly reviews and annual public summaries.

With a focus on the types of crimes ALPR is used for, the outcomes dashboard in PlateRanger provides tracking and reporting on plate reads that matched hot-list alerts that lead to an arrest, case clearance, or other major crime focus. The outcomes dashboard provides transparency that can be used in a public-facing portal or web page that is regularly updated to increase community trust and confidence. The outcomes and transparency can also help justify the technology to elected officials and command staff.

On retention, PlateRanger offers retention with configurable settings that match legislative requirements, with data stored no longer than 30 days unless an investigation requires it. Vehicle data that is connected to a hot list alert can be retained longer, depending on agency policy. Access to those records can be restricted to investigative purposes and limited by agency role.

PlateRanger’s patented incident-based retention feature goes even further by keeping only vehicles tied to hotlists. Agency policy and state law set supervisory approval, offense limits, and information needed for a vehicle hot list entry. License plates that match a hot list entry are retained under a longer, pre-determined agency policy, while vehicles that do not match a hot list entry are cleared from PlateRanger’s database much faster.

Technology settings are only part of a responsible program; written policy covers the rest. The PlateRanger Solutions Team can help your agency update an existing ALPR policy or develop a new one. That work can cover access rules, supervisory approval, retention periods, audit schedules, approved uses, and camera placement. The team can also help your agency configure PlateRanger so its logging and retention settings match the policy your agency adopts.